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There are 201 communities across the continental United States with 50,000 or less 
enplanements and commercial air service being provided exclusively by turboprop or 
propeller driven aircraft. The character and quality of air service to these communities 
has been consistently changing since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The 
insurgence of the Regional Jet into the regional aviation marketplace has been the recent 
instigator that has changed the quality determinants of regional air service. This study 
determines the influence of these factors in the determination of an airport’s demand for 
air service, to predict which of the 201 communities would most likely lose its air service. 
The resulting findings were that 79 of the 201 small community airports were identified 
as those who had a possibility of losing air service and 34 of those 79 were identified as 
airports most likely to lose air service in the next decade. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The domestic commuter airline industry has undergone a revolution in the 
past few years with the advent of the modern regional jet. After a slow- 
paced introduction by a lone United States carrier in 1993, the regional jet 
j-enzy has literally ‘taken off.’ Regional jets and modem turboprop 
aircraft have allowed the regional industry to achieve record growth. Such 
growth in passenger traffic will likely increase passenger demand for 
regional jet service and possibly compound the problems already faced by 
some small communities. (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation 
and International Affairs [OASAIA], 1998, pp. 1,22) 
This thesis reviews the impact of the Regional Jet on the quality of commercial air 
service offered by small community airports. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Beneficial changes and developments in governing regulations and aircraft design 
have brought the regional airline industry full circle. These changes have seen the 
industry develop from one that thrived off of service to local small markets, to one that 
with significant economic growth and the utilization of more sophisticated jet aircraft, has 
possibly outgrown these smaller markets. If the regional airlines are to effectively serve 
these small markets again, there must be additional, positive changes in the industry’s 
governing regulations and aircraft design. 
During the 1970’s the regional airline market consisted primarily of local 
commuter airlines that provided connections between local small cities and larger 
metropolitan areas. The aircraft utilized for this mission held between eight and fifteen 
seats and in most cases, were powered by reciprocating, piston engines. Deregulation of 
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the industry enabled the large national and major airlines to end the service they had 
provided to the small communities. These larger airlines then concentrated on the higher 
yield routes between the larger metropolitan areas, which provided the foundation for the 
current “hub and spoke” route system. Accordingly, small commuter airlines acquired 
larger turboprop aircraft to replace the aircraft once used by the major airlines on these 
low yield routes. 
During the 1 9 8 0 ’ ~ ~  the post-deregulation years, commuter airlines experienced 
significant growth, primarily through airline consolidation and the practice of “code 
sharing” with the larger major airlines. Consequently, during the 1990’s the former small 
commuter airlines, now consolidated, formed large regional operators. In an effort to 
capture a share of the rapidly growing market, regional airlines began to adhere to 
customer demands for jet service. This effort was evidenced by the fact that during the 
late 1990’s, all of the major regional airlines were flying Regional Jets, most with the 
expressed intent of using them to completely dislodge all the turboprop aircraft in their 
inventories. Unfortunately, the progression of the regional airline industry in aircraft 
design as seen in the replacement of turboprop aircraft with Regional Jets has proven to 
add to the air service woes of many small communities. 
In terms of legislation, following deregulation in 1978, the United States 
government subsidized unprofitable routes that would have not been served by scheduled 
airlines. This was a directed effort to improve the quality of air service offered at small 
airports since these unprofitable routes were very often those which connected to small 
communities. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program allowed airlines the chance to 
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remain profitable on these low yield routes. During the 1 9 9 0 ’ ~ ~  funding for the EAS 
program was significantly cut, which reduced the opportunities available for regional 
airlines to profitably serve these low yield routes to smaller communities. However, later 
in that decade EAS spending had rebounded and other legislation had been introduced in 
the attempt to solve the poor air service woes of small communities. Conversely, many 
industry experts questioned the increased governmental funding due to the ambiguous 
results of such programs in providing quality air service to small communities, especially 
since these increases occurred during a period of significantly decreased government 
spending. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are: 1) to determine the impact of the Regional Jet on 
the quality of commercial air service rendered by small community airports, and 2) to 
draw a conclusion as to whether govemmental support programs should be enacted 
andor continued to counteract any negative impacts that are discovered in the initial 
objective. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research questions will be examined: 
What are the impacts on the quality of commercial air service offered at small 
community airports, as a result of the regional airlines’ overwhelming 
acceptance of the Regional Jet? 
0 To what extent should the United States government fund regional airlines to 
service small community airports? 
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The following secondary research questions will be examined: 
0 What effect did the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 have on commercial air 
service to small community airports? 
What parallels may be drawn between the effects of the Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978 and the effects of the Regional Jet’s insurgence in the regional 
airline market as they affect service to small community airports? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
Existing data on the Regional Jet (RJ), small community airports and 
governmental legislation effecting the two was examined for possible connections related 
to the quality of service available at these small airports. The quality of air service, for 
this study, was identified as the frequency of flights being offered from an airport, the 
size and type of aircraft utilized for air service and the number of commercial passenger 
airlines serving an airport. This study focused on the effects or anticipated effects of this 
data as it applies to the domestic, regional airline marketplace. Only contemporary 
Regional Jets that were being produced and utilized between 1989 and 1999 were 
discussed and examined. Additional aircraft types were discussed only if there was to be 
comparisons made between them and the Regional Jets and/or if these aircraft serviced 
the small community airports. The air service trends from 1978 until the present relating 
to small community airports and the regional aviation marketplace were discussed and 
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examined. Larger airports, larger commercial jet aircraft and additional aviation focused 
legislation not related to commercial air service offered at small community airports or 
the Regional Jet was not included in this study. 
The scope of this study was refined to facilitate a specific focus on the effects of 
the Regional Jet on the quality of service rendered to small airports in the continental 
United States and the supporting related legislation. Areas outside of the stated region of 
focus were excluded due to the different environmental factors that determined their 
levels of commercial air service. 
2. Limitations 
The following related issues within the regional airline marketplace were 
developing concurrent to this study, therefore preventing the inclusion of certain pertinent 
data: 
Congressional discussion over legislation regarding the Regional Jet, possible 
increases in EAS funding, and possible increases funding for small 
community airports, all of which would directly affect industry trends, was 
examined. These legislative issues were discussed to familiarize the reader 
with the direction of the regional airline industry, but were not included in the 
data that was examined. 
Due to competition, regional airlines that were operating Regional Jets would 
not divulge specific load capacity data. The initial intent was to use this data 
in comparison to the load factors of turboprop aircraft being operated in 
similar markets, on similar routes. This comparison data would have been 
utilized to justif4r the “turboprop avoidance factor.” 
The latest enplanement trend data for all the small community airports was not 
available. Therefore, a sample of known airports was utilized to conduct an 
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analysis that targeted an airport’s enplanement figures. The utilization of only 
a sample, vice all the members fitting these criteria, narrowed the focus of the 
analysis and possibly omitted airports that could be in jeopardy of losing air 
service. 
3. Assumptions 
It is assumed that the reader has a minimal level of understanding concerning the 
basic market economic principles of supply and demand and general concepts concerning 
commercial aviation. This is necessary as these concepts are briefly reviewed in this 
thesis. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
There are numerous pieces of literature relating the state of the quality of 
commercial air service offered by small community airports and their probable future. 
Additionally, there are numerous pieces of literature hailing the Regional Jet’s insurgence 
into the commercial aviation marketplace, crowning it the king of the regional airline’s 
aircraft inventory. However, there are very few pieces of literature relating the two, or 
quantifying the effects of the Regional Jet’s presence on the future of small community 
airports. This thesis will review literature relative to these aircraft and airport types in 
order to identify a quantifiable correlation between the two. 
The methodology utilized to quantify the correlation between Regional Jet 
utilization and the hture of the small community airport utilized methodologies from 
three models. Fisher and Hulet (1982) developed and demonstrated a quantitative 
method to determine the minimum passenger enplanement totals required to justify air 
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service at local small community airports. The model focused on the primary aspects of: 
1) the distance of the community from a major hub, and 2) the quality of service offered 
by the local airport and the closest alternate airport (Fisher & Hulet, 1982, p. 21). 
Although the focus was on the spacial considerations as a determinant of an airport’s 
quality of air service, this model, however, omitted a currently relevant factor, the 
“turboprop avoidance factor” as a determinant in the quality of service calculations; a 
factor that was not diagnosed during a period concurrent to the Fisher & Hulet model. 
Vowles (1997) developed a model that predicted the loss of air service to small 
communities based on specific variables whose scope focused on certain operational, 
economical, geographic and social issues. Vowles’ model utilized a logistic regression to 
determine the probability of an airport’s loss of air service. However, Vowles did not 
capture the spatial consideration, the distance between a small community airport and a 
larger hub airport offering jet service, in his probability determination. Again, Fisher and 
Hulet (1982) exhibited that an small airport’s relative distance to a hub offering a higher 
quality of air service, is an important determinant relative to the future of air service at 
that small community airport. 
Brewer and Thorson (1978) developed a model that determined a city’s demand 
for commuter airline service. The model utilized a nonlinear regression analysis to 
identifl that the most viable determinants of demand for commuter air service were the 
respective community’s population and measurements of isolation of that community 
from the certified air carrier transportation system (Brewer & Thorson, 1978, p. 187). 
The model utilized the average daily enplanement figure of each respective community as 
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a dependant variable to identify the level of ridership needed by a community to support 
commuter air service. 
The methodology utilized in this thesis captures certain spatial considerations as 
identified by the Fisher and Hulet model and certain operational considerations as 
identified by Vowles’ econometric model, while incorporating the contemporary regional 
airline market factors of turboprop avoidance and Regional Jet stimulation. This thesis 
categorizes certain small community airports into two groups, those that are likely to 
retain their air service and those that are like to lose their air service. Through variance 
analysis, this thesis’ identifies the defining characteristics of each of these two groups and 
then determines the level of impact of each of the identified operational and spatial 
determinants, on the small community airports’ level of demand for air service. The 
thesis model utilized the small community airport’s average daily enplanement figures, as 
identified by Brewer and Thorson, as an expression of air service demand. 
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
0 Code Sharing: The partnering of a smaller regional or commuter airline with a 
larger major airline through the sharing of reservation coding, seating, 
scheduling and often identity. (Davies & Quastler, 1995, pp. 134-1 64) 
0 Commuter Airline: An air carrier that operates aircraft with 30 seats or less 
and a maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less and performs at 
least 5 round trips per week between 2 or more points and publishes a flight 
schedule. (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 559-560) 
0 General Aviation Airports: Airports with less than 2,500 annual 
enplanements. (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 559) 
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0 Hub: An airport in the national-airways system through which air carriers 
develop a system of routes of operation between it and other airports in the 
system. (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 558) 
0 Primary Airport: An airport that is receiving commercial air service with at 
least 10,000 annual passenger enplanements. (AAAE, 1999, pp. 2 1-22) 
0 Regional Airline: An air carrier holding a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity that operates aircraft with 30 seats or more; or a maximum 
payload capacity of more that 18,000 pounds, with annual operating revenues 
no greater than $100 million. (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 575) 
0 Regional Jet: A jet powered and propelled aircraft seating between 30 to 70 
passengers, having operational ranges from 300 to 1500 nautical miles at 
maximum speeds of 400 to 500 miles per hour. Abbreviated as RJ. (DOT, 
1998, pp. 6-1 1) 
0 Small Community: Communities having a maximum metropolitan area 
population of 300,000. (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1998, pp. 3) 
0 Small Hub Airport: An airport with between 0.05-0.0249 percent of the annual 
total of domestic enplanements and a minimum of 10,001 enplanements. 
(Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 559) 
0 Turboprop: A jet powered, propeller driven aircraft seating between fifteen to 
75 passengers, having operational ranges from 50 to 700 nautical miles at 
maximum speeds of 200 to 420 miles per hour. (Davies & Quastler, 1995, pp. 
47-48, 164, 150,447-448) 
0 Turboprop Avoidance Factor: A measurement of the extent to which a 
potential airline passenger will choose jet service over turboprop/propeller 
service. (Prall, 1997, pp. 26) 
0 Very Small Community: A community with a population of less than 25,000. 
(Reynolds-Feighan, 1999, pp. 564) 
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G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The first chapter of this thesis gives an introduction to the concepts and 
methodology used to identify the issues relating to the regional airline markets’ 
utilization of Regional Jets and their effects on the air service offered to small community 
airports. It identifies the research questions that the thesis is to address and defines the 
manner in which the thesis will address them. 
The second chapter encompasses the literature that frames the thesis’ conclusion 
and recommendations. It contains the findings and conclusions of consultants and other 
aviation experts regarding the market’s reaction to the insurgence of the Regional Jet and 
explains the models that were utilized to form the basis for the thesis’ methodology. 
Focusing on specific issues spurred by the Regional Jet as it relates to the small 
community airport, it narrows the broad view presented in Chapter I. 
Within the third chapter lies the thesis’ methodology. The models and procedures 
utilized to formulate the thesis’ foundational ideals are explained and their authors are 
credited. The data that was collected regarding the effects of Regional Jets on small 
community airports is presented in Chapter IV. Included are airport performance figures 
pertinent to problem identification and possible resolution. Chapter IV concludes with a 
relevant analysis of the data previously presented in the chapter. Finally, Chapter V 
presents the thesis’ conclusions and recommendations as well as areas that require further 
research. 
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11. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
A. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 AND THE SMALL 
COMMUNITY AIRPORT 
1. 
Prior to 1978, the government, through the efforts of the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), regulated the commercial airline marketplace. The CAB’s underlying belief was 
that air travelers were unwilling to pay the full cost for the air services found on the short- 
haul routes to small communities, but were killing to pay slightly higher than market 
costs on long-haul routes between large communities. If full cost were allocated to the 
passengers, it was believed that they would seek alternate means of transportation. With 
this in mind, the CAB consciously mandated that fares on these short-haul air routes be 
lower than market price and higher than market fares on long-haul routes. Congress 
decided to deregulate the airline industry due to its concern that the CAB’s practices 
Background of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
created market inefficiencies and stunted possible industry growth. Congress’ intent for 
deregulation was that it would: a) lower the airfares on the long-haul routes found at large 
community airports and slightly increase the airfares on short-haul routes found at small 
community airports, b) increase the number of airlines operating at most airports, thereby 
increasing competition, and c) increase the use of turboprop aircraft, vice jets, on short- 
haul routes to small communities that were not able to support jet service. (General 
Accounting Office [GAO], 1996, pp. 2) 
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2. A Before and After Comparison of the Airline Deregulation Act 
The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 placed control of the 
airline industry into the hands of the airlines, vice the CAB. Before deregulation, the 
CAB dictated the number of airlines and set airfares on air routes. Immediately following 
deregulation the market, which operated to obtain profit, dictated competition and 
determined airfares. Before deregulation, the CAB had subsidized air carriers if they 
were flying unprofitable routes, because it focused not on profits, but on providing 
communities access to the national transportation system. Immediately following 
deregulation, major air carriers pulled out of the small communities and sought to operate 
solely on the more profitable routes between larger communities (Vowles, 1997, p. 823). 
B. ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICE AND THE SMALL COMMUNITY AIRPORT 
1. 
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program sprouted from concern that following 
the ADA of 1978, small communities would lose air service once the national and major 
airlines, free from regulation to serve these less profitable routes, left their markets. 
Congress addressed this concern with the addition of section 419 to the Federal Aviation 
Act, which established the EAS program, as a method to ensure small communities had 
connection to the national transportation system via air service. (Office of Aviation 
Analysis [OAA], 1997, p. 1) 
Background of the Essential Air Service Program 
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An ironic holdover of the ADA of 1978 was the EAS program, which regulated 
air service at each community that received essential air service. The program 
established air carrier eligibility guidelines that: a) required it to offer a minimum number 
of round trips and a specified amount of available seats to a predetermined hub, b) to 
utilize a specified aircraft type with a set minimum seating capacity, and c) to minimize 
the number of intermediate stops enroute to the predetermined hub. An air carrier that 
offered these services to a community was stated to be servicing, in EAS program terms, 
a community with essential and “basic” air service. Communities which were receiving 
air service on October 24, 1978, and those not receiving air service but that were listed on 
an air carrier’s scheduled service certificate, were eligible for EAS program funding 
(GAO, 2000, p. 6). The Department of Transportation (DOT) supported the EAS 
program to the extent that it would subsidize an air carrier, if necessary, in the service of a 
community. Most communities, however, did not require that an airline receive a subsidy 
for it to render air service. (OAA, 1997, p. 1) 
Initially, Congress gave authorization for the EAS program to last for the ten 
years following the 1978 ADA, until October 23, 1988. With continued strong interest in 
the state of small community air service, Congress enacted the Airport and Airway Safety 
and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, which extended the EAS program for an additional 
ten years, until 1998. Also in 1987, Public Law 100-223 was enacted which included a 
provision for any EAS eligible community to receive “enhanced” essential air service if it 
would either share in the subsidies offered to an air carrier to provide the improved 
service or accept the risk of losing basic service if enplanement levels did not meet those 
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required to receive subsidy fimding. In 1996, Congress began funding the EAS program 
via the Rural Air Service Survival Act, which removed the September 30, 1998 program 
conclusion date. Throughout its tenure, funding levels for the EAS program have 
fluctuated, causing some communities to lose air service. (OAA, 1997) 
Currently, the EAS program, though modified from its beginnings in 1978, still 
survives in order to ensure basic levels of air service are offered at small community 
airports. The program offers subsidy benefits and the requirement that an air carrier 
submit a ninety-day notification prior to its discontinuance of air service, to eligible 
community airports. Present day eligibility requirements include community location 
greater than 70 highway miles from the nearest medium-hub or large-hub community 
airport and a per passenger subsidy limitation of 200 dollars. If the community is located 
greater than 2 10 miles from the nearest medium-hub or large-hub community airport, the 
per passenger subsidy limitation is waived. The DOT subsidized 68 communities in the 
continental United States, through the EAS program, in 1999. (GAO, 2000) 
2. 
There have been mixed views regarding the effectiveness of the EAS program. 
Reynolds-Feighan (1999) suggested that the effects of the EAS program are positive, 
beginning with the fact that it fostered growth in the regional airline marketplace by 
encouraging commuter airlines to fill the niches left by major airlines which vacated 
small, unprofitable markets following the passing of the ADA of 1978. This was 
evidenced with the fact that commuter airlines that handled only ten percent of the total 
Differing Views Regarding Program Effectiveness 
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small community airport’s enplanements in 1977, grew to handle 51 percent of these 
enplanements by 1988. Also aiding in EAS growth and improving the position of the 
small community airports, is the fact that, as stated by Reynolds-Feighan, the EAS 
program has apparently shifted its focus from the “small community”, to the “very small 
community” (see definitions on p. 9). This shift is apparent with the fall of the average 
population of the communities receiving EAS subsidies to a 1999 figure of 24,306. 
(Reynolds-Feighan, 1999) 
The basis of opposition to the EAS program has its foundation in that regulation 
generally does not promote an atmosphere of market efficiency. Vowles (1997) 
highlighted the fact that in order for an airline to be profitable, it must be allowed to 
match the service it renders to the demand offered in a particular market. The very small 
community markets that are the majority of the EAS program stakeholders often only 
have enough ridership to support small turboprop aircraft (Vowles, 1997, p. 828). The 
traveling public sentiment against small turboprop aircraft has grown increasingly more 
intense following 1995 due to the concern raised by several high-profile, turboprop 
accidents (OASAIA, 1998, P.5). This sentiment has been named the “turboprop 
avoidance factor.” As a result of this phenomenon, passengers are often unwilling to fly 
turboprop aircraft, an experience that usually escalates to a phobia when it comes to 
flying smaller turboprop aircraft. Therefore, as Boyd (1 998) suggested, the government 
could be paying airlines to fly aircraft that the majority of passengers do not want to fly. 
The result, subsidized empty seats. As reported in the GAO’s (2000) report on the EAS 
program, the facts show that out of the 68 communities in the continental United States 
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that receive subsidized air service, 30 experienced decreased levels of ridership, with an 
average loss of 27 percent. These facts appear to validate Boyd’s concerns. 
Boyd (1 997) suggested that the Department of Transportation should be reminded 
that the purpose of the EAS program was to provide basic service to eligible small 
communities in order for them to have continued access to the national transportation 
system. Reynolds-Feighan (1 999) reported that the average distance between small EAS 
communities and their nearest large or medium hub community airports was 171 miles 
for subsidized communities and 121 miles from the unsubsidized EAS communities. 
Travel times between these EAS communities and their closest large or medium hub 
community airports would vary in respect to these distances, road quality and traffic 
conditions (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999). However, Morrow (2000) stated that in an 
informal survey, Delta Air Lines recently found that its passengers dislike flying 
turboprops so much that most are willing to drive two to five hours to avoid flying on 
them. The distances between the subsidized and the unsubsidized communities and their 
closest hub community airports, lie well within the driving distances mentioned in the 
Delta Airline survey. The passenger losses experienced by 44 percent of the subsidized 
communities could be as a result of what Vowles called the “gravity effect.” Vowles 
explained that the gravity effect is the leakage of passengers from a smaller airport to one 
that offers superior air service. 
As explained by Boyd (1 998), since a significant number of EAS communities are 
experiencing reduced traffic due to the turboprop avoidance factor and the gravity effect, 
it is suggested that the EAS program has been, especially recently, ineffective. Boyd’s 
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(1997) basis for this conclusion lies in the fact that the traveling public appears to have 
connected themselves, not the EAS program, to the national transportation system via 
highways that lead to airports that offer jet service. In essence, if the market forces were 
allowed to operate vice the regulations of the EAS program, Boyd (1998) predicts that 
many EAS communities, possibly those that experienced significant decreased ridership 
from 1995 to 1998, would likely lose all air service. However, all would not be lose, for 
these communities seem to already have connected themselves to the national 
transportation system via respective local highways, therefore, fulfilling the purpose of 
the EAS program (Boyd, 1997). 
C. POST-DEREGULATION GROWTH 
1. Policy Changes 
Davies and Quastler (1 995) discussed several issues resulting from deregulation 
that had a great impact upon the commuter aviation marketplace. Probably the most 
influential change described was a change in FAA regulations that allowed of commuter 
aircraft to increase in size from a maximum of 30 to 55 seats as well as an increase in 
payload from 7,500 pounds to 18,000 pounds. This particular policy change, as Davies 
and Quastler point out, allowed many larger aircraft types to be utilized to serve the small 
community airports and thus facilitate the industry’s ability to carry larger passenger 
loads which increased its growth potential. 
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2. Reasons for Growth 
Post-deregulation growth was experienced by commuter airlines in markets that 
connect small communities to large metropolitan areas. This growth was significantly 
quickened by the 1979 fuel crisis, which deterred passengers fiom using their cars to 
drive short distances due to higher gasoline prices. Also, the fuel crisis created an 
atmosphere that made the utilization of large aircraft in the service of short routes, highly 
uneconomical. This fact caused major airlines to pull out of important intercity routes 
such as New York to Philadelphia, in order to reduce and further avoid the higher 
operating costs that accomponied such routes. These abandoned routes were then picked 
up by commuter airlines. The combination of these factors increased the importance of 
the short-haul, high-density markets. In just three years following deregulation, 
commuter airline enplanements increased by 34 percent, a fact that is exhibited in Table 
2.1. (Davies & Quastler, 1995, pp. 115-122) 
3. Results of Growth 
Rapid growth in traffic and route networks following passage of the ADA quickly 
lead to a shortage of commuter aircraft shortage soon ensued. Manufacturers struggled o 
support demand and were forced to develop new aircraft to fit the needs of the commuter 
airline marketplace (Davies & Quastler, 1995, pp. 1 15-1 22). Immediately following the 
ADA of 1978, airframe manufacturers, in an effort to keep up with commuter airline 
demand, produced larger numbers of newly designed, turboprop aircraft. As the number 
of aircraft produced increased, the number of aircraft being utilized for passenger service 
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increased. In 1979 alone, the aircraft utilized by regional and commuter airlines 
increased by 21 percent (Jewell, 1999, p. 2). This boom in aircraft manufacturing was 
initially focused on aircraft seating a maximum of 19 passengers. The focused 
production of smaller sized turboprop aircraft was a direct result of the CAB’S and the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) commuter airline aircraft limitations, which 
limited an aircraft’s payload and required a flight attendant on all aircrafi seating more 
that 19 passengers (Davies & Quastler, 1995). In their analysis of the industry, Bemstein 
and Abbey (1997) identified that during the early 1980, the regional airline market 
place’s major demand was focused on the 30-plus passenger turboprop aircraft. 
Companies such as deHavilland, Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, Fokker, Saab and 
Embraer flooded the market with aircraft that fit its need (Bernstein & Abbey, 1997). 
During the 1990s, the regional airline marketplace has demanded fuel efficient jet 
As they have done in the previous aircraft that seat between 30 and 90 passengers. 
decades, aircraft manufacturers such as Aero International Regional (AIR), Bombardier 
(formerly deHavilland), British Aerospace (partners with Aerospatiale with the AIR 
corporation), Embraer, and Fairchild-Domier, have answered the industry’s demand with 
aircraft meeting its requirements. According to Vowles (1 997), the increased demand for 
jet aircraft is based on technological advancement and customer satisfaction. The ideals 
of technological advancement and customer satisfaction have their foundation in basic 
market economic theory, with technological advancement being a determinant of supply 
and customer satisfaction being a determinant of demand. Therefore, the change in focus 
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of the regional airline marketplace to Regional Jets represents a market that is being 
fashioned by basic economic determinants. (Bernstein & Abbey, 1997) 
4. 
Not all communities have benefited from the commercial aviation industry’s 
market growth resulting from deregulation (GAO, 1998, p. 1). A 1998 GAO study 
concluded that small community airports, especially those located in the East and upper 
Midwest, have experienced poorer air service since deregulation. Determining an 
airport’s air service quality was found to be a decision based on subjective weighting of 
the importance of the number and frequency of flights to passenger desired destinations 
and the type of aircraft used (GAO, 1996, p. 3). The East’s and the upper Midwest’s 
small community airports had experienced a decline in the quantity and quality of air 
service witnessed by sharp declines in the number of available nonstop flights, frequency, 
and in the amount of jet service relative to turboprop service (GAO, 1998, p. 3). 
However, this decrease in jet service to small community airports was not just 
experienced in the previously mentioned regions, but rather throughout the entire 
domestic commercial aviation marketplace. In a 1996 GAO study regarding the effects 
of deregulation, it was reported that the number of jet departures from small community 
airports had fallen 27 percent during the post-deregulation period of 1978 to 1995. The 
result of this decline was an increase in turboprop departures from small community 
airports (GAO, 1996, p. 47). The reason for the decrease in jet service was found to be 
largely because established airlines, following deregulation, had reduced jet service from 
Decrease in the Quality of Air Service 
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these smaller airports and deployed turboprops to link these communities to the major 
airlines’ hubs (GAO, 1998, p. 3). 
Small community airports did experience some growth immediately following the 
ADA of 1978. Ironically, this growth was a result of the withdrawal of air service by the 
major airlines that operated jet service. Due to the small load factors often experience at 
small community airports, major airlines would be unable to earn a profit by utilizing 
more costly jet aircraft in these markets (GAO, 1996, p. 48). As previously mentioned, 
when the major airlines discontinued service to small community airports following 
deregulation, commuter airlines operating smaller, less costly turboprop aircraft filled the 
niche. During the period immediately following deregulation, regional airline market 
growth was experienced through code sharing between the smaller commuter airlines and 
the larger major airlines (Davies & Quastler, 1995). Thus, code sharing fostered an 
environment where the utilization of turboprop aircraft in the service of small 
communities became paramount. 
The GAO (1996) reported that the view of the DOT, as voiced through interviews 
with analysts, was that the frequency of departing flights from an airport was the most 
important factor in the determination of an airport’s quality of air service. The analysts 
also stated that the type of aircraft being utilized for service was the least most important 
factor in determining the quality of service. The basis for their view was that the overall 
size and safety of turboprop aircraft had increased dramatically since deregulation. DOT 
analysis, therefore, conducted a study showing that turboprop aircraft provide levels of 
service quality equivalent to that ofjet aircraft. (GAO, 1996, pp. 48-49) 
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Unfortunately, passengers may not hold the same favorable feelings respective to 
turboprop aircraft as do the DOT analysts. One of the major determinants of the regional 
airline marketplace’s focus was, and still is, passenger preference, which translates into 
market demand. As shown previously, passengers clearly prefer jet air service to 
turboprop air service. In a report by the OASAIA (1 998) on Regional Jets, it was stated 
by one regional air carrier that due to the turboprop avoidance factor, passenger traffic 
would increase on some routes by as much as 20 percent if the turboprop aircraft 
servicing that route was replaced by regional jets. As a response to consumer preference, 
major airline’ smaller code sharing affiliates are increasingly purchasing and utilizing jet 
aircraft (GAO, 1998, p. 11). As this purchasing phenomenon occurs, the quality of air 
service of small community airports by regional airlines, in the view of the GAO, will 
improve (GAO, 1998, p. 11). 
5. 
In 1993, Comair began operating the Regional Jet and became the first domestic 
airline to operate an aircraft of this type. By 1996, Comair’s operational and fiscal 
performances shattered all previous records. Revenues increased by 28 percent, earnings 
rose an unprecedented 105 percent and load factor increased to 54.1 percent. Comair 
attributed its part of its phenomenal growth to its decision to operate the Regional Jet. By 
1997, having observed Comair’s success, every major regional airline had Regional Jets 
on order (see Figure 2.1), with the top regional airlines possessing the intent on evolving 
into all jet fleets. (Prall, 1997, pp. 26-36) 
The Insurgence of the Regional Jet 
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Even though passenger acceptance of the Regional Jet has been as 
overwhelmingly high as their dislike of the turboprop, Boyd (1997) stated that these jets 
would not replace the turboprops on all operational routing. Leading industry experts 
agree that on routes with distances of greater than 400 miles that are being flown by 
turboprops, will see the infusion of Regional Jets (OASAIA, 1998, p. 2). Operational 
statistics have shown Regional Jets to have lower operating costs, compared to turboprop 
aircraft, on routes that are between 500 and 1,000 miles long (Morrow, 2000). The 
operational range of the Regional Jet, which in most cases at least doubles that of 
turboprops, has created new point to point, vice point to hub, connection opportunities 
which add to the customer appeal of the aircraft (Butler & Poole, 1998, p. 21). Butler and 
Poole suggested that the Regional Jet would allow many small communities, which lack 
nonstop jet service the opportunity to connect with others small cities also lacking jet 
service. However, on routes of 200 miles or less, the lower operating costs of the 
turboprop give it a distinctive advantage (Shifrin, 1997, p. 50). Another important reason 
why Regional Jets are unable to replace all turboprop operations are the small levels of 
ridership and the runway length limitations exhibited by numerous small community 
airports (Shifrin, 1997, p. 50). 
While Regional Jets may not replace the turboprop in all operating regimes, Boyd 
(1 997) concluded that they might dislodge many of them from the inventories of regional 
airlines. The higher purchase cost of the Regional Jet in comparison to those of 
turboprop and passenger distrust of the turboprop have lead to a reduction of turboprops 
from regional airline inventories (Morrow, 2000). In order to finance the purchasing of 
23 
Regional Jets, regional airlines are selling off their inventories of turboprop aircraft 
(Boyd, 1997). Also promoting the reduction of turboprop aircraft in regional airline 
inventories are passenger distrust and disdain of the turboprop. These factors have 
combined to become a catalyst propelling regional airlines to move toward all jet fleets 
(Pascual, 1997). 
The hture for the Regional Jet appears to be bright, while the forecasts for 
turboprops appears dreary (see Figure 2.2). In 1999, Bombardier’s Canadair CRJ, a 
Regional Jet, replaced Saab’s 340, a turboprop, as the regional airline market’s leader in 
lift capacity, measured in passenger seats available, by supplying 14.12 percent of the 
industry’s total lift capability (RAA, 2000). During 1999, Regional Jets provided for 3 1 
percent of all regional lift (Jewell, 1999). During the next 20 years, industry experts 
predict that total Regional Jet sales will approach 2000 aircraft (Abbey & Bernsteen, 
1997). 
In 1997, the FAA, in order to address safety concerns relating to smaller 
turboprop aircraft, began requiring air carriers to operate all aircraft designed to seat more 
than ten passengers, in accordance with regulations previously applied only to larger 
aircraft (Abbey & Bernsteen, 1997). As a result, to avoid the costly upgrades, many 
regional airlines purged their 19 seat aircraft from their aircraft fleets, evidenced by a 11 
percent reduction in utilization by regional airlines of aircraft seating 19 or fewer 
passengers (Jewell, 1999). Experts forecast that between 1998 and 2008, turboprop 
aircraft in this seating category will only make up seven percent of the total 1280 aircraft 
deliveries (Abbey & Bernsteen, 1997). These were the main type of aircraft used by 
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regional airlines to service small community airports. Industry experts warn small 
communities that are anticipating the upgrading of their local airport’s turboprop service 
to jet service, to not expect such deals if their airport’s ridership or runway limitations 
prohibit such transitions (Shifrin, 1998, pp. 56-57). In fact, Boyd predicts that in the 
next ten years, over 100 small community airports will lose air service due to the regional 
airline market’s acceptance of the Regional Jet. 
D. LEGISLATIVE AID FOR SMALL COMMUNITY AIRPORTS 
Poole and Butler (1998) revealed that constituents have besieged their 
policymakers with complaints regarding the quality and quantity of air service offered at 
many small community airports. Many of these policymakers lent an ear to their 
constituents and have introduced legislation that, if adopted, would brighten the future for 
the small community airport. The following are highlights from legislative aid for small 
communities that is currently being sought: 
Air Transportation Improvement Act: Legislation would increase Small 
Community Air Service grant program from 30 million dollars to 80 million 
dollars, would retain Airport Improvement Program eligibility for small 
airports where enplanements temporarily dip below 10,000, and would 
authorize grants to underserved communities for marketing incentive 
programs to attract and enhance air service (American Association of Airport 
Executives [ M E ] ,  1999). 
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century: Legislation would 
triple the minimum entitlement for non-hub airports from 500,000 to one point 
five million dollars, would create a loan guarantee program to assist airlines in 
buying Regional Jets if the airlines agree to use them to serve small 
community airports for 12 consecutive months, and would create a new 
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funding program to help small, underserved airports market and promote its 
air service ( M E ,  1999). 
Small Communities Air Service Act of 1999: Legislation would require the 
Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study into the efficacy of a program 
to provide federal loan guarantees for the purchase of Regional Jets by 
commuter air carriers and would establish a four-year pilot program to assist, 
through grants, up to 40 communities with inadequate access to the national 
transportation system in order to facilitate better air service linkups (AAAE, 
1999). 
0 Air Service Restoration Act: Legislation would establish a five-year, 100 
million dollar pilot aviation development program for up to 40 small and 
underserved communities with grants up to 500,000 dollars to each approved 
airport for local initiatives to attract and promote air service (AAAE, 1999). 
E. RESEARCH ISSUES 
A review of the relevant literature which spoke to the effects of the ADA of 1978 
on the quality of air service offered at small community airports and the respective 
legislation enacted to counteract the resulting negative effects, and after a review of the 
relevant literature which spoke to the insurgence of the Regional Jet, the suggested results 
of this insurgence and the prospective legislation to improve the future of the small 
community airports, certain research issues were raised. In particular, no documented 
research was observed regarding the possible impact of the turboprop avoidance factor on 
the air service offered at small community airports. 
With the recent insurgence of the Regional Jet into the regional airline 
marketplace, many passengers now have the option of choosing jet service as opposed to 
26 
with turboprop aircraft. It was shown that passengers would go to great lengths to avoid 
turboprop aircraft and utilize jet service, therefore, directly correlating turboprop 
avoidance with Regional Jet acceptance. This trend relates to small community airports 
because as documented by the GAO (1996), following the ADA of 1978, the 
predominant aircraft type utilized in the service of small community airports was the 
turboprop. Also, the OASAIA (2000) listed that the type of aircraft most utilized to 
service EAS communities was the 19-seat turboprop, with 93 percent service utilization. 
This thesis utilizes the concepts as discussed in the review of relevant literature, to 
quantiQ the effects of contemporary trends expressed in the regional airline marketplace. 
The EAS program eligibility requirements state limitations relative to how close an 
airport can be located, in highway miles, to a medium or large-hub community airport 
(Reynolds-Feigham, 1999, pp. 576-577). The Brewer and Thorson (1 978) model utilized 
this principle of an airport’s proximity to a major hub to capture the effects of a larger 
airport’s attraction to passengers due to its superior quality of service, called the gravity 
effect, in comparison to a smaller community airport. This model, however, did not 
consider the contemporary concept of turboprop avoidance. Turboprop avoidance and 
the resulting market appeal of the Regional Jet have created an atmosphere where jet 
service has become available at much smaller airports. The DOT definition of a hub 
airport is one whose enplanements are 0.05 percent of the nation’s annual total 
enplanements, which for 1997 was greater than 320,78 1 (Reynolds-Feigham, 2000, p. 
559). Airports of this size are receiving jet service from major airlines (OAG, 1999). 
Therefore, the Brewer and Thorson model did not fully capture the results of the gravity 
27 
effect because it did not consider that there could be a higher quality of air service being 
offered at smaller airports, due to the insurgence of the Regional Jet. 
The Hulet and Gordon (1982) model focused on frequency as the major 
determinant in predicting which small community airports should retain, or obtain, air 
service. Again, with the insurgence of the Regional Jet being prevalent in the last decade, 
this model did not determine what effect a small community airport’s viability to jet 
service, had on its probability for maintaining air service. 
Finally, the Vowles (1997) model, in predicting which small community airports 
would most likely lose air service, identified that communities that were receiving EAS 
subsidies definitely had a higher probability of losing air service. This conclusion was 
based on the concept that, due to the disruption of basic economic market realities caused 
by governmental subsidies, if a community were to fail to receive further subsidies, then 
it would lose its air service because of the lack of economically support. However, 
instead of using quantitative, historical data to determine whether or not a community 
would lose air service, the Vowles based its conclusion on human experience. 
The focus of the research of this thesis is to determine, utilizing the quantitative 
methodology of variance analysis between relevant, historical and contemporary 
operational and spatial determinants, the effect of the Regional Jet on the quality of air 
service offered at small community airports. 
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Figure 2.2. Regional Aircraft Deliveries Forecast for 1998-2008, 
From Abbey, D. & Bernsteen, G., 1997. 
Note: J=Jet, TP=Turboprop, & Associated Numbers Indicate Seating 
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111. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH FOCUS AND APPROACH 
1. Research Focus 
In the absence of existing research relating to air service trends at small 
community airports, this thesis focuses on determining the impact, and the level of 
market influence, of the Regional Jet on the quality of commercial air service offered at 
small community airports. The determinants of air service quality utilized in this 
research were isolated to specifically include the frequency of flights being offered, the 
size and type of aircraft utilized for air service, the number of commercial passenger 
airlines servicing the airport, and the distance of that airport from an airport offering jet 
service. Two of these determinants, the size and type of aircraft utilized and the 
proximity of an airport to one offering jet service, specifically relate to the turboprop 
avoidance factor andor the gravity effect, are direct results of the insurgence of the 
Regional Jet into the regional aviation marketplace. Flight frequency is an industry 
accepted determinant of the quality of air service rendered by any commercial airport. 
2. Research Approach 
In order to analyze the hypothesized significance of the determinants of quality on 
the level of air service being offered by small community airports, a variance analysis 
model was utilized. Variance analysis was used to identify the impact of certain 
operational and spatial variables on the determination of a small community airport's 
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level of passenger utilization. It was reasoned that if significant variance is found 
between the air service determinants of the differing airport groups, which were those that 
were identified as possibly retaining their air service and those that possibly would lose 
their air service, then assumptions could be made that identified the Regional Jet’s effect 
on small community airports’ levels of air service. 
Small community airports that posted 1998 enplanements of 50,000 or less, were 
identified as those which had a possibility of losing their air service and therefore, were 
selected for possible analysis. This assumption was based on Boyd’s (1998) 
determination that all airports with enplanements of or below 50,000, would be in 
jeopardy of losing their air service due to the insurgence of the Regional Jet. Of the 
commercial airports that had posted enplanements of 50,000 or less, only those being 
served exclusively by propeller propelled aircraft were selected for analysis. Therefore, 
the small community airports that were included in this study had the characteristics of 
posting 1998 enplanements of 50,000 or less and being served exclusively by propeller 
propelled aircraft. 
To determine the different populations upon which to conduct a variance analysis, 
historical trend analysis was used on the selected small community airports, to determine 
whether or not a city had the probability of keeping (KEEP) or losing (LOSE) its air 
service. A (KEEP) designation was assigned to airports that had greater than 10,000 
enplanements and a history of increasing or stable enplanements during the eight-year 
(1 991 -1 998) observation period. Stability was determined as sustained performance, 
without the presence of dips in enplanements of 20 percent or greater than the airport’s 
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eight-year enplanement average. A (LOSE) designation was assigned airports that posted 
1998 enplanements of than 10,000 or a history of decreasing or unstable enplanement 
performance. The enplanement figure of 10,000 was used as a point of delineation, in 
conjunction with the FAA’s separation of airports into two groups, primary and non- 
primary (see definitions on p. 9) (AAAE, 1999). Based on their classification as either a 
primary or a non-primary airport, airports receive different levels of governmental 
funding, due to their evaluated level of need. In essence, the FAA has determined that 
non-primary airports require additional funding because the posses a higher risk of losing 
their primary funding tool, which is their air service. The stability figure of 20 percent 
was used because it has been shown that Regional Jets can create market gains or 
possible loses, of 20 percent or more (Prall, p. 26, 1997). If an airport has been 
experiencing loses of 20 percent or more in its enplanement figures, it was assumed that 
the Regional Jet would greatly effect its demand for air service. Thus, through the use of 
Boyd’s determination and the previously mentioned criteria, 79 airports were analyzed as 
those that would probably keep air service, KEEP designated, and 122 airports were 





DAY-ENPLANE: This variable represents the average daily enplanement of an 
airport. This figure was calculated by taking the 1998 enplanement figures from 
the FAA’s Air Carrier Activity Information System (ACAIS) and dividing that 
figure by 365 days. 
A VL-SEA TS: This variable represents the number of available seats offered by an 
airport. It was determined by first, calculating the total number of seats available 
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on each of the airport’s departing flights, and then, totaling these to identify the 
total number of departing seats available. The information for this variable was 
obtained from the OAG (1999). The variance between this variable’s KEEP and 
LOSE components is expected to be relatively large, indicating that airports have 
been classified as those retaining their air service will be offering significantly 
more flights than those airports that were classified as probably losing their air 
service. 
PLANE-SIZE This variable represents the maximum number of seats allowed on 
the largest type of aircraft being utilized to provide service to the airport. The 
information for this variable was obtained from the OAG (1999). The variance 
between this variable’s KEEP and LOSE designated airports is expected to be 
significant, indicating that the airports identified as those which would retain their 
air service, are being serviced by larger aircraft. This will also be an expression of 
the dislike that passengers have relating to flying small turboprop aircraft, a 
variant of the turboprop avoidance factor. 
AIRLINES This variable represents the total number of air carriers servicing the 
each airport. The information for this variable was obtained from the OAG 
(1999). The variance between this variable’s KEEP and LOSE designated 
airports is expected to be relatively large, indicating that airports that will retain 
their air service are being serviced by more than one air carrier. The airports that 
will probably lose their air service are those being serviced by a sole air carrier. 
0 ISOLATION: This variable represents the highway distance from each small 
community airport to an airport that was listed in the OAG (1999) as having jet 
service. The variance between this variable’s KEEP and LOSE designated 
airports is also expected to be significant, indicating that small community 
airports have a greater probability of retaining their air service, the further they are 
away from airports offering jet service. The closer a small community airport is 
to another airport which offers jet service, the more likely it is to lose it air 
service, because of the loss of passengers due to the gravity effect. 
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C. ANALYSIS COMPARISON 
A variance analysis was conducted between each variable’s airports that were 
designated as those likely to keep their air service (KEEP) and those likely to lose their 
air service (LOSE). Through the comparison of these different groups of airports, 
conclusions were drawn relative to the differing levels of influence the Regional Jet had 
on the KEEP airports as opposed to the LOSE airports. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. FINDINGS OVERVIEW 
The data utilized for this study was taken from the historical, operational and 
spatial observations of 201 small community airports that met the inclusion criteria stated 
in Chapter 111. Of the 201 airports, this thesis identified 79 small community airports that 
most likely are to retain their air service (KEEP) and 122 small community airports that 
most likely are to lose their air service (LOSE). 
B. ANALYSIS 
To accomplish variance analysis within each variable, between the airports 
designated as KEEP and LOSE, the existence of significant variance between these 
different populations must be established. Table 4.1 summarizes the variance analysis 
statistics for each component of each variable. 
1. The Daily Enplanement Variable 
a. Analysis 
DAY-ENPLANE, a variable defining the average daily enplanement of 
each airport, was shown to have a large F-value and a small P-value. This signifies that 
the different populations of data, the KEEP and the LOSE components, exhibit 
significant variance and, therefore, are significantly different and distinct. The KEEP 
component of the DAY-ENPLANE variable, in comparison with its LOSE component, 
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Table 4.1. Summary of Variance Analysis Statistics 










































had the higher mean, 53.25. Of the 201 small community airports observed, there were 
35 airports identified within the KEEP component, 54 percent, which had DAY- 
ENPLANE values greater than its mean. Conversely, there were only 27 airports 
identified within the LOSE 
component, 22 percent, that had DAY-ENPLANE values greater than the larger KEEP 
mean of 53.25. 
b. Discussion 
The DAY-ENPLANE variable’s components of KEEP and LOSE 
exhibited the most significant variance. This large variance between components was 
created by the significantly larger amount of daily enplanements posted by the airports 
identified within the KEEP component as compared to those within the LOSE 
component. An analysis of this data results in the logical conclusion that, the higher the 
amount of daily enplanements, the higher the probability that an airport will retain its air 
service. 
DAY-ENPLANE is a direct result of passenger demand, because, by 
definition, it is an airport’s passenger volume, and passenger volume is determined by 
passenger demand. The major determinant of demand that has been discussed by this 
thesis, has been turboprop avoidance, or rather, Regional Jet stimulation. Contemporary 
passenger demand has forced all of the major regional airlines to purchase Regional Jets 
to maintain their respective market shares. The higher a community’s ridership, the more 
likely that community’s air service is to be supplemented with jet service. The 
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communities that were studied in this thesis did not have the ridership necessary to 
support large jet aircraft. However, with many regional airlines experiencing breakeven 
load factors of as few as 21 passengers on their Regional Jets, certain small community 
airports may have the opportunity to receive jet service (OASAIA, 1998, p. 5). This will 
occur if an airport’s daily passenger volume is at least 53 passengers, the mean of the 
airports identified as those most likely to retain their air service. 
With passenger dislike and distrust of small, turboprop aircraft and their 
acceptance of the Regional Jet, demand for air service at small community airports with 
jet aircraft has been forecasted by industry experts to grow significantly in the next 
decade (Boyd, 1997). Therefore, though the significant variance found between DAY- 
ENPLANE’S components of KEEP and LOSE was not created by the Regional Jet, the 
larger enplanement figures of those airports within KEEP, will become attractive 
marketplaces for Regional Jet operators. And with further market stimulation created by 
the entry of Regional Jets into these markets, the variance between those small 
community airports within KEEP and those within LOSE is forecasted to increase. 
Those airports within LOSE, who cannot spur enough market demand to maintain 








2. The Total Available Seats Offered Variable 
a. Analysis 
Observation of the variable AVL-SEATS, which represents the daily total 
number of seats available on all the airport’s departing flights, exhibited a large F-value 
and a small P-value. These values indicate a significant variance between the KEEP and 
LOSE components of the AVL-SEATS variable, verifying that a comparison analysis 
between these two different populations of data can be performed. These differences in 
component populations are highlighted in the difference observed in the KEEP and LOSE 
mean values of 2 16.30 and 14 1.10, respectively. Within the AVL-SEATS variable, 52 of 
the airports identified within the KEEP component, 63 percent, offered greater than 150 
daily seats available. However, 73 of the airports identified within the LOSE component, 
60 percent, offered less that 150 daily seats available. If a market used a 50 seat Regional 
Jet to offer a minimum of three departures a day, a figure established as basic service in 
the EAS program, the minimum amount of seats offered by that market would be 150. 
b. Discussion 
The AVL-SEATS variable’s components have the second most significant 
variance found in the model. This variable captures the combination of the determinants 
of frequency and aircraft size. In terms of frequency, as previously mentioned, the GAO 
(1996) reported the opinion of the DOT was that the frequency of departing flights was 
the most important factor in the determination of an airport’s quality of air service. The 
GAO report also stated the type of aircraft servicing an airport was the least important 
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factor. Bombardier Aerospace (1 998), airframe manufacturers of both turboprop and 
Regional Jet aircraft, had findings consistent with those of the GAO, stating that 
passengers indicated that flight frequency was the most important determination in their 
choosing flight service, while again, the type of aircraft providing the flight service was 
the least important factor. 
The findings of this thesis concur with DOT’S and Bombardier 
Aerospace’s findings and opinions to the fact that flight frequency is an important 
determinant of demand. This thesis’ findings illustrate this point in the variance analysis 
of the variable AVL-SEATS in Table 4.1. However, this thesis does not agree that the 
aircraft type is the least important factor of passenger demand. First, the statistics relating 
to the turboprop avoidance factor, which some Regional Jet operators have stated can be 
as much as a 20 percent improvement in market share, and with the phenomenal 1996 
fiscal growth experienced by Comair, due largely to the replacement of its turboprop fleet 
with the Regional Jet, identify that aircraft type is a very important component of demand 
(Prall, 1997, pp. 26-28). Also included in the turboprop avoidance factor is the flying 
public’s dislike and distrust of small turboprop aircraft. Frequency becomes 
inconsequential if passengers are not willing to fly on the aircraft. Second, also as 
previously mentioned, airlines are profit-seeking entities (Vowles, 1997, p. 827). 
Therefore, unless regulations or restrictions hinder them for doing so, airlines must match 
frequency and aircraft type and size with market demand in order to make a profit 
(Vowels). In essence, airlines will place a certain size andor type aircraft into markets, 
to operate at specified frequencies, where passenger ridership will support them. This, 
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again, exhibits the importance of aircraft size and type as well as departure frequency, to 
flight demand. 
To capture the importance of both frequency and, specifically, aircraft size 
in a single variable, the AVL-SEATS variable represents the number flight departures, 
frequency, multiplied by the number of seats from the aircraft offering those frequencies, 
aircraft size. Aircraft type was already built into the variable due to the fact that all the 
airports studied were receiving air service solely from turboprop or propeller driven 
aircraft. Thus, the large variance identified between the KEEP and LOSE components of 
AVL-SEATS, was a direct result of regional airlines matching the components of AVL- 
SEATS with market demand, expressed in ridership. Small community airports that were 
identified as those within the KEEP component had 52 airports, 63 percent, with AVL- 
SEATS values of greater than 150 seats, while airports identified as those within the 
LOSE component had 73 airports, 60 percent, with AVL-SEATS values of less than 150 
seats. A commercial airport’s future is only as viable as its air service. With the current 
market trends heavily favoring Regional Jet service, if an airport’s flight demand cannot 
support Regional Jet service, then the hture of that airport’s air service is in jeopardy. 
3. The Number of Airlines Variable 
a. Analysis 
The variable AIRLINES, which defined the number of commercial air 
carriers servicing an airport, exhibited a relatively large F-value and a small P-value. 
Again, these values indicate the existence of a significant variance between the KEEP and 
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LOSE components. Although the size of the F-value is not as large as found in the 
previously mentioned variables, there does exists a difference in the KEEP and LOSE 
components, as expressed in mean values of 1.32 and 1.1 1, respectively. These values 
indicate that of the airports studied the major portion of these received services from one 
airline. There were 21 airports within the KEEP component, 27 percent, which were 
served by more than one airline. There were only 12 airports within the LOSE 
component, 10 percent, that were served by more than one airline. 
6. Discussion 
The AIRLINE variable’s components of KEEP and LOSE also exhibited 
significant variance. The relatively low enplanement figures of the airports included in 
this study, less than 50,000 during 1998, created a relatively small difference in variance 
between the AIRLINE components of KEEP and LOSE. Although there was a small 
separation of their mean values, a significant variance was shown between components 
due to the larger number of airlines that were servicing the KEEP component’s airports, 
as compared to the LOSE component’s airports. This is a logical conclusion because, 
according to basic economic principles, if more than one air carrier is servicing a 
community, then there should be enough ridership to support continued air service by at 
least one of the airlines, should one of the airlines discontinues service. The number of 
airlines serving a market also directly relates to the quality of air service offered in that 
market. Once again, since airlines are profit maximizing entities, if only one airline were 
to service a market, then air fares are expected to be higher than those offered in a market 
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with multiple air carriers where competition has limited air fares. All of these factors 
resulted in 21 airports, 27 percent, identified within the KEEP component being serviced 
by more than one airline and 110 airports, 90 percent, identified within the LOSE 
component, being serviced by a sole air carrier. Relating to the effect of the Regional Jet 
within this variable, currently there are less than 10 airports that receive jet service 
provided by a sole air carrier (OAG, 1999). Thus, airports with a sole carrier have a 
significantly lower chance of obtaining jet service. An analysis of these results leads one 
into the logical conclusion that, the more air carriers that service a market, the higher the 
probability that an airport will retain its air service. 
4. The Size of the Aircraft Variable 
a. Analysis 
An observation of the PLANE-SIZE variable, which represents the 
maximum number of seats offered on the largest aircraft servicing an airport, revealed a 
significantly large F-value and a small P-value, indicating the existence of a significant 
variance between the KEEP and LOSE components. The mean values of these 
components, 25.86 and 22.05, respectively, represent the average seating capacity of the 
aircraft utilized in service. Of airports within the KEEP component of the PLANE-SIZE 
variable, 42 received service from aircraft seating more than 20 seats, which represents 53 
percent of its population. Of the airports within the LOSE component, 93 received 




The PLANE-SIZE variable’s components of KEEP and LOSE exhibited 
significant variance. Although their statistical means were separated by a small value, a 
significant variance was shown between components due to the larger number of aircraft 
with 20 or more seats that were servicing the KEEP component’s airports, compared to 
those servicing the LOSE component’s airports. The variance analysis results lead one to 
the conclusion that the larger the aircraft being utilized to serve an airport, the larger the 
probability that the airport will retain its air service. Relevant to this methodology is 
again, the airline’s ability to match the size of the aircraft being utilized to the market’s 
ridership demand. When airlines are unable to match aircraft size and market demand, 
such as is done under the aircraft a size limitation of the EAS program, they are certain to 
operate inefficiently and ultimately, will discontinue air service. 
A direct connection can be identified between the variance analysis results 
and the turboprop avoidance factor. Passengers’ dislike of small turboprop aircraft causes 
them to avoid flying. This avoidance leads to lower enplanement levels of airports solely 
dependent upon air service being provided by small turboprop aircraft with 19 or fewer 
seats. With the major regional airlines purging their aircraft fleets of all aircraft with 19 
or fewer seats and with a bleak future relative to the future of other regional aircraft (see 
Figure 2.2.), airports being served solely by aircraft of this size, will have a very high 
probability of losing their air service. Interpretation of these factors resulted in 42 
airports, 53 percent, identified within the KEEP component, being serviced by aircraft 
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with greater than 20 seats, while 93 airports, 76 percent, identified within the LOSE 
component, were being serviced by aircraft with 19 or fewer seats. Within the EAS 
program, aircraft seating 19 or fewer passengers, service 63 of EAS-subsidized 
communities’ airports, which is 93 percent of all of EAS airports. This fact renders the 
majority of the EAS communities in jeopardy of losing air service should subsidies cease. 
In essence, the larger the aircraft utilized to serve a community airport, the higher the 
probability that the airport will retain its air service. Also, the larger the aircraft utilized 
to serve a community airport, the higher the probability that Regional Jet service will be 
substituted for its turboprop service. 
5. The Isolation, Distance from Jet Service, Variable 
a. Analysis 
The variable ISOLATION, which represents the distance each of the 
studied airports were from an alternative airport which offered jet service, exhibited a 
negligibly low F-value and a very large P-value, indicating little or no variance between 
its KEEP and LOSE populations. The lack of significant variance indicates that there is 
little or no difference recognized between the two populations, an observation highlighted 
by relatively equal mean values of 1 10.90 and 1 1 1.49. Thus, due to the lack of significant 
variance, variance analysis cannot be performed on this variable. 
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6. Discussion 
The ISOLATION variable’s components of KEEP and LOSE did not 
exhibit any significant variance, an indication that there exists little or no variation 
between these component populations. This fact is highlighted in the relatively equal 
mean values of 110.90 and 11 1.49, respectively, calculated for the KEEP and LOSES 
components. Although the lack of variation inhibits variance analysis, an analysis can be 
made based upon operational and market trends within the regional airline industry. The 
contemporary prominence of the Regional Jet has improved small communities’ access to 
the national transportation system. This improvement has not been necessarily seen in 
industry wide increases in passenger traffic for small community airports, but rather in 
the decrease in distances passengers have to travel to reach an airport that provides jet 
service. 
As the larger, small community and small-hub airports begin to receive jet 
service, traveling distances will decrease because passengers will utilize these airports as 
opposed to driving the extra distances often necessary to utilize services offered at the 
large or medium-hub airports. The average separation between the small community 
airports included in this study and airports serviced by Regional Jets was 11 1 miles. The 
significance of this fact can also be shown within the EAS program. During 1990, the 
average distance between the nearest large or medium-hubs was 171 miles for the 
subsidized communities (Reynolds-Feigham, 1999, p. 57 1). Comparatively speaking, the 
EAS communities observed in our study exhibited an average distance of 142 miles, 
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between the respective airport and the nearest airport offering jet service. Understanding 
that highway travel times will be dependent upon road quality and traffic conditions, 
however, all things being equal, the mean values observed within the ISOLATION 
variable place the majority of the small communities of this study, within a two hour and 
fifteen minute drive of Regional Jet service. With passengers willing to drive two to five 
hours to avoid turboprop service, one can deduce that when small community airports are 
this close to Regional Jet service, if they do not provide service that is at least equal to 
that of the alternative airport, then they will most likely will experience the “gravity 
effect.” Thus, although variance analysis was not utilized, it was deduced that due to the 
expansion of affordable jet service as provided by the Regional Jet, more communities 
are located within a relatively close proximity of jet service. Therefore, relative to their 
respective airports, if the service is not comparable to that as offered by the Regional Jet, 
the local airports will most likely experience the gravity effect. 
6. 
Upon considering the cumulative results of the variance analysis calculations, 
relative to the variables defining the number of daily enplanements, available seats, 
number of airlines and plane size, all of which were shown to play major roles in 
determining an airport’s flight demand, it was determined that the 34 airports identified in 
Table 4.2 are those most likely to lose service within the next decade. By determining 
the turboprop avoidance factor’s or the Regional Jet stimulation’s effect on each of 
Communities Most Effected by the Regional Jet 
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determinant variables, it was determined that the insurgence of the Regional Jet is the 
predominant reason why these airports are likely to lose air service. 
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Table 4.2. List of Cities Most Likely to Lose Air Service 
Kinston 
Groton-New London 
CITY I STATE I CITY I STATE 11 
AR IN -1 NC Hot Springs CT Terre Haute 
I I 
IIUtica I NY lClovis 
rn 
Bradford PA Beckley wv 
Winston-Salem NC Kingman Az 
Rocky Mount NC PoncaCity OK 
53 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
54 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The flight demand determinants for small community airports, that were found to 
be most affected by the insurgence of the Regional Jet, were those that indicated an 
airport’s average daily enplanement, total amount of seats offered on departing flights, 
number of airlines that provided service and seating size of the largest aircraft that 
provided service. The differences in these variables, between the KEEP group and the 
LOSE group are statistically significant. In essence, if an airport had fewer than five 
daily departing flights, offered on propeller propelled, 19-seat aircraft, and was being 
serviced by only one airline, then that airport will most likely lose its air service within 
the next ten years. These trends, which were shown to exist as a result of the insurgence 
of the Regional Jet, are the characteristics of the 34 airports listed in Table 4.2. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Passengers clearly prefer flying jet aircraft vice turboprop aircraft and will go to 
great lengths to do so. The relatively low operating costs of Regional Jets, compared to 
larger jet transports, will afford many small community airports, which have significant 
ridership, the opportunity of having their air service provided by jet aircraft. The 
Regional Jet represents an advancement in technology that offers the regional airline 
passenger “seamless service” as they connect to the regional’s larger counterpart. 
Seamless service refers to the ability of a passenger to transfer from a regional airline, 
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onto its larger counterpart, without any noticeable difference in the quality of service. 
Unfortunately, as shown in this thesis, small community airports that have modest levels 
of enplanements, currently receiving service by turboprop aircraft that seat 19 or fewer 
passengers and are within two and a half hours of an alternative airport that offers 
Regional Jet service, or any jet service, will find themselves in search of air service in the 
next decade. Of the 34 airports that were listed as most likely to lose air service due to 
the Regional Jet, all had the operational and spatial high-risk characteristics that were just 
listed. Two of the 34, Winston-Salem and Kinston, North Carolina, have already lost air 
service. In both cases, airport enplanement dropped significantly between 1996 and 
1999, the period where Regional Jet utilization became prominent, because passengers 
chose to drive to nearby airports that offered jet service. Even though the airports were 
being serviced by 19 seat turboprop aircraft that provided just four departures a day, 
ridership still dropped below levels necessary for the servicing airline to just break even. 
Since 1991, these two small community airports experienced an average enplanement 
drop of 40 percent, due to market trends such as turboprop avoidance and the gravity 
effect (FAA, 1999). Unless situations or trends within the regional airline industry 
drastically change, the remaining 32 are apparently heading for the same fate. 
In addition to the EAS program, there are four additional legislative packages that 
represent an attempt at resolving the small community airports’ air service woes (see 
Legislative Aid to Small Community Airports in Chapter 11). Though all require 
increased governmental funding directed toward small community airports, two of these 
packages propose to provide governmental backing of the purchase of Regional Jets by 
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regional airlines, for the specific purpose of providing service to small community 
airports. Governmental influences, as directed by regulations that limit the free 
movement of market forces, can create gross inefficiencies within the marketplace. 
Instead of re-regulating an industry whose deregulation has netted passengers an 
estimated annual savings of 19.4 million dollars, observers have suggested that all 
remaining governmental economic interventions should be removed (Butler & Poole, 
1998, p. 1). An example of this can be found within the current administration of the 
EAS program. Over the past five years, passenger enplanements have only grown six- 
tenths of one percent, while per community and per passenger subsidies have increased 
50.2 percent 'and 66.6 percent respectively, at EAS subsidized small community airports 
(GAO, 2000, p. 20). These figures show that empty seats on numerous 19-seat aircraft 
are being subsidized. Again, this is due to the fact that passengers just do not want to fly 
small turboprop aircraft, even if their seats are subsidized. Also, it should be noted that 
19 out of the 34 communities, 56 percent, identified as those whose airports were 
predicted to lose air service within the next decade, were communities that are receiving 
EAS subsidies. This program's inefficiency mandates the necessity of a program revision 
and a rethinking of governmental, economically based intervention in the regional airline 
industry. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Market forces created the Regional Jet. Regional airlines wanteh an aircraft that 
could approximate the range and speed of larger jet transports, but at operating costs 
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similar to large turboprop aircraft. They have also known for quite some time that 
passengers do not like flying on turboprop aircraft, but did so because they had no 
feasible alternative (Morrow, 2000). The Regional Jet was the manufacturers’ supply 
answer to a market-driven demand issue. 
Legislation that promotes the purchase of Regional Jets with government backed 
loans, that will funnel government h d s  into small community airports or that subsidize 
air service, does not allow the market the fieedom to adjust to possible demand changes. 
Just as the Regional Jet was a response to market demand, so might some other aircraft 
fill the void left in regional air service due to current market trends. If passengers choose 
to drive to an alternate airport to fly Regional Jets, and enroute, pass their local, small 
community airport, then this should be allowed, without government intervention. This 
will cause many airports, especially those listed in Table 4.2, to lose their air service. 
When passengers decide that they want to fly out of their local, small community airports 
again, as opposed to driving several hours to find jet service, then the demand for local 
service will increase. Airlines seeking new markets, or possibly, newly formed ones 
seeking to fill the need, will begin to demand aircraft from aircraft manufacturers, that are 
suited to most efficiently and effectively fill the need, while meeting the quality demands 
of the passengers. Legislation impedes innovation and development because it fills a 
current need with current technology. If the need is allowed to persist without 
interference that is external to the market, then innovators will devise new and better 
ways of efficiently addressing current needs with futuristic solutions. In other words, if 
small community airports are allowed to lose service and they do so at such an alarming 
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rate that customers are hindered in carrying out their desire to travel, then demand will 
rise to a level that will promote the development of new airlines and new aircraft to 
supply the market’s demand. 
EAS funding should be reduced by granting subsidies to only those select few 
airports whose communities are remotely located and whose surface connections to other 
major metropolitan areas have been evaluated as poor. In cases such as these, air service 
is not a luxury, but a necessity. Funding agencies should keep in mind that the goal of 
the EAS program is to ensure small communities have access to the national 
transportation system. Access does not necessitate air service, but could also be achieved 
via highways or railroads. Government funding of small community airports in order to 
promote air service should be reconsidered. Communities who derive their own solutions 
to their air service problems, are much more likely to support the resulting outcomes. A 
popular example of this is the uniting of a community’s business entities to form 
partnerships with local airports and air carriers in an effort to promote air service. 
Community support, in cases such as these, has been known to be relatively high, which 
renders positive results to all associated parties. 
One possible resolution to the small communities’ air service problem is 
regionalization. Regionalization involves small communities joining together and 
supporting one airport in their region, with their ridership. The combination of several 
small community airports ridership could possibly heighten that regional airport’s 
enplanements to a level that would attract and support Regional Jet service. The 
reluctance to do this is high, as most communities are not willing to voluntarily surrender 
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their air service. However, with the lack of growth exhibited by small community 
airports due to current market trends such as the turboprop avoidance factor, may force 
communities into action. For small communities whose airports are not reasonably 
located with other small community airports, improving the highway systems, vice 
regionalization, is a more viable resolution. 
D. RESPONSES TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Simply put, Regional Jets have decreased, and will continue to decrease, the 
quality of air service offered at small community airports. Only those airports with 
enplanements sufficient of supporting Regional Jet service stand to benefit from its 
insurgence into the regional airline marketplace. Government agencies should not rush to 
fund solutions to the air service problems of the small community airports, but rather, 
foster an atmosphere where communities are empowered to formulate their own 
solutions. This is due to the positive possibilities of community focused, vice 
government focused resolutions and because governmental economic intervention into 
the marketplace can create numerous market inefficiencies. The withdrawal of 
governmental intervention is not new, for it was the focus of the Airline Deregulation Act 
of 1978. Ironically, because of governmental concern relative to the loss of air service by 
small community airports as a result of the ADA of 1978, EAS legislation was enacted to 
protect these airports and to ensure that they remain connected to the national 
transportation system. Thus, the ADA of 1978 had the same effect on air service to small 
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communities, as does the contemporary acceptance of the Regional Jet, which is they 
both created a reduction in the quality of air service offered by small community airports. 
E. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
To examine the full effect of the Regional Jet on the commercial aviation 
I marketplace, possible future studies could be focused on the following: 
The Regional Jet’s effect on the EAS program, dealing specifically with the 
viability of subsidies and current eligibility requirements. 
0 The turboprop avoidance factor’s effect on the future development turboprop 
technology. 
0 Possible alternatives to aviation subsidy programs. 
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